The poaching of rhinos has increased dramatically in recent years, creating an ongoing problem and cost to rhino managers. A manager may decrease the reward to the poacher by devaluing the horn such as dehorning so that only a stub is left, or inserting a poison, dye or GPS tracker.
Introduction 1
The illegal trade in rhino horn supports aggressive poaching syndicates and a black market 2 (Nowell et al. 1992 ). This lucrative market entices people to invest their time and energy to gain 3 a 'winfall' in the form of a rhino horn, through the poaching of rhinos. In recent years poaching 4 has escalated to an unpresidented level resulting in concerns over their future existence (Smith 5 et al. 2013). In response, rhino conservation has seen increased militarisation with 'boots on 6 the ground' and 'eyes in the sky' (Duffy et al. 2015 ). An alternative method is to devalue 7 the horn itself, one of the main methods being the removal so that only a stub is left. The Smith 2013). However, like dehorning, they cannot remove all the potential gain from an intact 12 horn (poison and dyes fade or GPS trackers can be removed). This paper considers the general 13 strategy of devaluing horns, which includes dehorning.
14
Rhino populations now persist largely in protected areas or on private land, and require 15 intensive protection (Ferreira et al. 2014 ). For wildlife manages law enforcement is often one 16 of the main methods of detering poaching, however rhino managers can remove the poaching 17 incentive by devaluing their rhinos (Milner-Gulland 1999).
18
A manager does not need to choose law enforcement or devaluing, but perhaps adopt a 19 combination of the two; especially given that devaluing rhinos comes at a cost to the manager, 20 and the process comes with a risk to the rhinos. Milner-Gulland and Leader-Williams (1992)
21
found the optimum proportion to dehorn using mean horn length as a measure of the proportion 22 of rhinos dehorned. They showed, with realistic parameter values, that the optimal strategy is 23 to dehorn as many rhinos as possible. Further, Milner-Gulland and Leader-Williams (1992) 24 Lee et al. discussed dehorning as a better strategy than anti-poaching protection since the benefits are 25 carried over to subsequent years where the rhino horn length is shorter, whereas anti-poaching 26 protection costs are renewed each year.
27
We consider one year only, for a single rhino manager. We assume a given amount of re-28 source available for the year, and that all rhinos initially have intact horns. Rhino managers 29 may devalue a proportion of their rhinos. We assume that managers would like to devalue as cooperative decision-making dynamics, and (e) whether an optimal or satisfactory solution for 37 all stakeholders can be reached simultaneously (Colyvan et al. 2011 ).
38
The model we present is similar to the cyclic model used by Bell (1986) , where the stake- intact horns, it does not pay poachers to be selective so they will become random poachers.
46
Conversely, if all poachers are selective, it pays rhino managers to invest in devaluing his/her rhinos. This dynamic is represented in Fig. 1 . rhino value is only measured by its horn value), and s be the proportion of selective poachers.
55
Assuming a poacher encounters a rhino, there are four scenarios which depend on the strategy 56 of the players. The probabilities of each of these four scenarios are given in Table 1 . The actual
Horn devalued
Horn intact Selective The rhino manager initially has C resources, which is the cost to devalue the horns from all expensive, perhaps due to start-up costs, then α > 1, however in reality this is unlikely to be 72 the case so we consider 0 < α ≤ 1 only.
73
Let K be the cost to the rhino manager from rhino killings. Then the expected payoff for a 74 manager under each scenario is given in Table 2 , where the payoff is in terms of reducing the 75 loss to C. Therefore, the expected payoff to the manager is the sum of all four expected payoffs 76 in Table 2 ,
Notice that when r 1/α < sK/C the expected payoff is positive, which signifies the savings from 78 unused resources C.
79
The expected payoff to the manager is linear in s, meaning that for any given proportion 80 of devalued rhinos r, the relationship between the proportion of selective poachers s and the 81 expected payoff to the manager is linear. Therefore for any given r, if there is a maximum 82 expected payoff to the manager, it is at s = 1 (all rhino horns are devalued).
83
Conversely for a varying proportion of selecting poachers s, the expected payoff to the 84 manager is at a maximum when
calculated by setting ∂E m /∂r = 0. Equation (2) often has a maximum larger than 1, meaning that the manager can only minimise his or her loss by devaluing all the rhino horns, r = 1.
87
For the optimum proportion of rhinos to devalue to be less than one, the manager requires 
The rhino poacher

94
The rhino poacher initially has no resources. Essentially the expected payoff to the poacher 95 is the amount gained from an intact horn, or a devalued horn, less the time and risk to find and 96 kill a rhino, and this is all relative to the salary and lifestyle of the individual poacher. Let H 97 be the gain to the poacher from an intact and γH, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, be the gain from a devalued horn.
98
We consider the time to kill a rhino T , the time to find a rhino F and, for the selecting 99 poachers, a discerning time D to establish whether the rhino has an intact or devalued horn. E p is the sum of all four expected payoffs in Table 3 ,
Hor devalued Horn intact Selective
An individual poacher can choose his or her behaviour instantaneously, flipping from ran- 
109
Consider the situation where only one poacher visits the ranch and behaves randomly s = 0 110 then, from (3), the manager needs to devalue
to ensure the poacher does not make a profit. Assuming H > F + T , the right-hand side of 112 equation (4) is greater than one if F + T < γH. That is, if the time and associated risk to find 113 and kill a rhino is less than the gain from a devalued horn, the random poacher cannot make 114 a loss irrespective of the portion of horns devalued, thus the manager has 'lost the game' (the 115 bottom right quadrant of Fig. 1 ).
116
Alternatively, if the poacher behaves selectively s = 1 then, from (3), the manager needs to
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to ensure the poacher does not make a profit. Equation (5) the game' (the top left quadrant of Fig. 1 ).
122
The model does not change in time. That is, should the variables for either players change,
123
the expected payoffs need to be recalculated. 
The rhino manager
126
We consider some examples and examine the expected payoff for the rhino manager in the proportion of rhinos that need to be devalued to minimise loss to resources.
133
In the case of fairly sparse rhinos, say α = 0.125 (Fig. 3d) , a larger proportion of selectors 134 are required before it is deemed worthwhile to devalue. However, once devaluing has been 135 deemed a cost saving expense, a significant portion of rhinos need to be devalued. Generally,
136
as α → 0, the optimum proportion to devalue increases.
137
In the case where the cost of devaluing all rhino horns (the total resource) is equal to the 138 cost of one killed rhino C = K (Fig. 3a) , the manager can ensure that no loss is incurred for all
139
proportions of selecting poachers by devaluing at most s α rhinos (from equation (2)).
140
The manager can conserve the most resources when C < K (Fig. 3b) , despite the optimum 141 would be an inadvisable strategy. Even when all poachers are selective, it is not beneficial to 144 devalue a significant portion, and this portion decreases as C >> K. 
The rhino poacher
146
We consider some examples and examine the expected payoff for the rhino poacher in (4)). When F + T = γH, the only deterrent is devaluing 153 all rhinos (Fig. 4a) . Should the gain from a devalued horn drop, the necessary proportion of 154 rhinos to devalue drops (Fig. 4b) . Conversely, should the gain of a devalued horn increase so 155 that F + T < γH, there is not an optimum proportion to devalue since a damaged horn would 156 still prove profitable for the poacher (Fig. 4c) . Although the manager has little control over the 198 or campaigns aimed at changing behaviour, although the latter may take some time to impact 
